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Public Sector Furloughs: Player Perspectives, Strategies, and Grounds for
Challenge
By Ryan Shannon
I. Introduction
Furloughs are on the rise at a time when
tough economic conditions are driving
up the demand for state services.1 Longused to close budget gaps in economic
downturns, furloughs were widespread
in the early 1990s, but public employers
have used them at greater rates in the
latest recession than at any time since
World War II.2 A furlough is a period of
non-work. The term can be further
qualified to mean a period of non-work,
generally no longer than two or three
days at a time, from which the employee
is guaranteed to return.3 Furloughs can
be voluntary or mandatory; paid or
unpaid; and applied uniformly or
imposed unevenly on employees based
on take-home pay. This flexibility is
attractive to employers trying to stop
the bleeding in times of rapid downturn.4 Since the global economic collapse
began in 2007, at least 24 states have
adopted some type of furloughs to meet
their budgetary shortfalls.5 These include: California, where upwards of
189,000 executive branch employees
have been furloughed for three days
each month; Maryland, where 70,000
government services employees will be
furloughed for 20 days over the next two
years; and Hawaii, where public school
teachers agreed to 17 annual furlough
days.6 Even with improved economic
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indicators, states face an estimated
$110 billion budget gap in the next two
fiscal cycles.7 Furloughs are likely to be
even more widespread as states move
through the two years following the
recession, which are typically "states'
toughest budget years."8
This article explores the social and
legal consequences of furloughs in the
public sector. Part II analyzes the
perspectives of the various players,
including unions, employees, employers, and members of the public. Part III
surveys the law governing authority to
declare furloughs at various levels of
government. Part IV summarizes the
constitutional basis under which unions
and employees have challenged furloughs.

II. Player Perspectives
A. Unions and Members
Unions walk a fine line in deciding
whether to support or oppose furloughs.
For unions, temporary and short-term
furloughs are preferable to layoffs
because union members keep their jobs
and remain members. Furloughs also
keep current contracts in place with
only temporary salary reductions. When
the economy improves, unions that have
accepted furlough days will not have to
bargain back concessions they might
have otherwise made. Opposing furloughs can be risky since employers
with time-sensitive budgetary needs
may feel it easier to simply issue layoffs,
which are not likely to have legal
complications.9

Some unions have used the
furlough as another bargaining chip
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at the table.10 For example, in
Connecticut, unions agreed to take
seven unpaid furlough days over
two years in exchange for a promise
that the state would not lay off any
employees until at least 2012.11
Public sector unions in Massachusetts and New Jersey exacted a
similar promise in exchange for
wage freezes and unpaid furlough
days.12
Unions recognize that furloughs are
preferable to layoffs for employers for a
number of reasons, the most salient
being the political price employers pay
in carrying out layoffs and reducing
services permanently. Furloughs do
have political consequences as well.
Unions can barter not only over whether
furloughs will be enacted, but also how
they will be enacted; a union might
concede, for example, to an employer's
decision to order a complete office shutdown, where all employees stay home on
the same day and the public is unable to
make use of government services, and
threaten to oppose rolling furloughs
(where the public is less visibly affected)
to exact a greater price at the bargaining
table.13
For individual employees, furloughs can have substantial benefits
over layoffs. Even where the wages lost
during furloughs are not later reimbursed,14 employees may prefer to have
the option of volunteering for long
weekends or extending their vacations
with a few days of unpaid leave.15 In
periods of economic decline, a steady
source of even a reduced income is often
preferable to standing in unemployment
lines and searching for new employ-
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ment. Individual employees are increasingly living paycheck to paycheck,
however, and even a slight reduction
or delay in weekly pay can cause
When Hawaii Governor
hardship.16
Linda Lingle's proposed three-day per
month furloughs for state executive
branch employees were struck down as a
violation of the state's constitution in
2009, the judge expressed concern that
"[t]he nature of a 13 to 15 percent cut in
these wages sets in motion changes of
jobs, failure of workers to make rents,
mortgages, failure . . . to pay tuitions, to
pay their loans, creating bad credit
ratings, and cascading effects from these
events."17 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals expressed a similar concern in
invalidating the City of Baltimore's
furloughs in 1993, noting an annual
salary reduction of $240 dollars "could
represent a substantial portion of a
monthly mortgage or rental payment, or
weeks of food."18
B. Employers and the Public
Furloughs have structural and institutional advantages for public employers. By furloughing employees rather
than terminating them, public employers are better able to maintain morale
and institutional expertise. Furloughs
have the benefit of speed and flexibility
– features which can be essential when
economic calamity takes public officials
by surprise.19 Moreover, as discussed
above, furloughs can be more politically
expedient than layoffs. Unions are often
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represented on both sides of the table,
and public employers may prefer to use
furlough days where the union pushes
for them in lieu of layoffs.20 Additionally,
a temporary shutdown can save on
infrastructure costs including heating
and energy.21
But not all costs are avoided.
Employees with collective bargaining
agreements continue to collect health
and retirement benefits while furloughed.22 Where the contract permits,
employers may seek additional savings
by structuring furlough days so that
employees drop below the minimum
level of hours necessary to accrue health
benefits,23 though such a decision is
likely to raise the risk of legal challenge
by unions. There is also evidence that
furloughs, if structured improperly, are
ineffective at preserving money in the
public coffers.24 Following Governor
Schwarzenegger's furloughing of state
employees in February
2009, the
Berkeley Center for Labor Research and
Education released a study, finding that
the savings were far less than claimed
considering25 "lost state income taxes
from state employees; reduced revenue
collection; . . . and the funds needed to
maintain retirement benefits:"26
Based on new data . . . on actual
savings from the furloughs since
February 2009, we estimate a
reduction in wages and benefits of
$2.01 billion for 193,000 workers
over the course of the year.
Accounting for the share of furloughs that impact workers who are
not on the General Fund, lost
revenue, and increased costs due to
the furlough program, the net
savings to the General Fund for FY
09-10 is estimated to be just $738
million. The FY 09-10 furloughs will
further result in a loss of $503
million over the subsequent years,
leaving a net savings of $236 million
to the general fund.27
The report concluded that, "for every
dollar in reduced spending from furloughs, the state saves . . . 12 cents when
losses in subsequent years are taken
into account."28 The report also indicated that the furloughs would result in
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"disruptions of state services [with] an
impact on the broader economy."29
An employer's ultimate decision to
furlough rests on its ability to convince
the public that the furlough is to their
benefit. Closed offices result in delays in
licensing and can interrupt important
government projects or cause major
inconveniences for members of the
public. In the 1995-1996 federal government shut down,30 for example, the
Center for Disease Control lost several
weeks of data regarding the spread of
AIDS and the flu virus; seven million
potential national parks patrons were
forced to forego their visits; and 200,000
U.S passport applications went unprocessed.31 In the most recent economic
downturn, furloughs of state workers
charged with processing Social Security
payments have been especially widespread.32 Even though funding for the
program comes from the federal government, state workers process claims, and
furloughs extend an already long-term
application process.33 Where cuts are
especially deep, counties and municipalities find themselves in the undesirable position of slashing emergency
response funding or reducing staff at
facilities providing public safety,34
which includes firefighters, police, staff
at prisons and healthcare workers.35

III. Authority to Furlough
A. Executive/Gubernatorial
Authority
The power to furlough, as differentiated from the authority to close or
combine executive agencies, is typically
(and initially) based on the same implied
or express constitutional powers to
direct the dispensation of the state's
budget that give rise to the ability to
enter into collective bargaining agreements. In entering a collective bargaining agreement, a state or city executive
is giving up part of its sovereignty and
becomes like an ordinary individual;
"instead of . . . a reservation of some
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sovereign right to withhold payment, the
contract should be regarded as an
assurance that such a right will not be
exercised. A promise to pay, with a
reserved right to deny or change the
effect of the promise, is an absurdity."36
But where there is no guarantee of
wages or hours of employment in a
collective bargaining agreement, a state
or city executive acts within a constitutional mandate when ordering furloughs. In Colorado, for example, once
the state's legislative apparatus "appropriates the funds, the Governor takes
over to 'administer the appropriation to
accomplish its purpose.'"37
In a 2009 opinion, the Colorado
Attorney General argued that the
Colorado Constitution "invests the
Governor with discretion to take acts to
defray the cost of government" and
"allocate staff and resources."38 Within a
separation of powers analysis, the
authority to declare mandatory furloughs was implied, and "consistent
with the legislature's acknowledgement
that the Governor, within his executive
authority, can and should restrict the
number of employees to the minimum
necessary for efficient operation of the
State."39
The governor's power to direct the
dispensation of funding, or to rein it in
through furloughs, is essential in light of
the executive branch's general incapacity to appropriate funding, even in
periods of emergency.40 In Virginia, for
example, the state's Emergency Services and Disaster Law provides that
the governor may declare a state of
emergency "[w]henever, in the opinion
of the Governor, the safety and welfare
of the people of the Commonwealth
require the exercise of emergency
measures due to a threatened or actual
Though the governor's
disaster."41
emergency powers are broad, including
to some extent an ability to waive state
law (and enact furloughs),42 Virginia's
Constitution explicitly states that "[n]o .
. . appropriation of public or trust money
or property . . . shall be passed except by
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the affirmative vote of a majority of all
members elected to each house. . . ."43
The separation of powers doctrine limits
the governor's emergency powers to the
management of appropriated funds,
making the implied power of furloughs
all the more important when a government shutdown looms for lack of new
appropriations.44
Several states explicitly allow the
governor to furlough employees or shut
down services in the event of a state
emergency – fiscal or otherwise. By
statute, mandatory furloughs are expressly permitted in Colorado following
the declaration of a fiscal emergency by
that state's General Assembly.45 This
authority differs from the more general
constitutional authority used by Governor Ritter to declare furlough days in
2009.46 During a budget negotiation
crisis in 2006, New Jersey Governor
John Corzine declared a state of
emergency to invoke special powers
granted to him under the New Jersey
Disaster Control Act.47 By declaring an
emergency, Corzine was able to "shut
down non-essential government services to avoid problems," in advance of
the impending budgetary deadline.48
Among the services Corzine designated
"non-essential" were New Jersey's
Casino Control Commission and Division of Gaming Enforcement.49 The
political pressure from the Casino
shutdown influenced the legislature to
act quickly in overcoming the negotiation impasse, but caused significant
damage to the industry and led many to
criticize Corzine's invocation of emergency powers as a political ploy and an
abuse of authority.50
Even where state executives have
the authority to declare furloughs, there
is a secondary question as to the scope of
their authority in selecting the manner
of implementing those furloughs. The
Civil Service Amendments to the
Colorado Constitution provide only that
classified employees "hold their respective positions during efficient service."51
The Colorado Attorney General has
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opined that these provisions do not
prevent the governor from exempting
certain departments or positions from a
furlough plan, but instead merely
require "equal pay for equal work."52
Since "[e]mployees who are furloughed
receive less pay, but . . . also work less,"
an exemption from furloughs for certain
departments or worker classifications is
ostensibly "in keeping with the equal
pay for equal work requirement."53
At the municipal level, the issue
presented is not always the authority to
declare an unpaid furlough, but the
authority as between city executives to
direct which employees will be subject
to that declaration. In Burnette v.
Stroger, for example, the Cook County
Public Defender squared off against the
President of the Cook County Board
when the president selected specific
employees in the defender's office to be
furloughed.54 In Illinois, the Public
Defender Act "provides the public
defender with the right to 'appoint'
attorneys to serve as assistant public
defenders, who then 'serve at the
pleasure of the Public Defender.'"55 The
court differentiated between the county
board's power "to fix the number and
compensation of the assistant public
defenders," and the public defender's
right "within that fixed number, to hire
and fire individuals to serve as assistant
public defenders and staff members."56
Though the board had an implied right
to furlough employees generally, the
Public Defender Act placed the authority to implement the furlough squarely
in the hands of the public defender.
Another potential constraint on
executive authority to declare furloughs
is the essential nature of the service. In
Colorado, for example, there may be an
implied authority by statute allowing
the governor to suspend or discontinue
certain services once it becomes apparent that insufficient revenues are
available to provide for those services.57
An executive at the municipal level may
be constrained by charter provisions
describing particular governmental func-
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tions as "mandatory," as is sometimes
the case with certain duties of the city
prosecutor's office.58 Unions have had
little success, however, in arguing that
public safety services are mandatory
where not expressly deemed so. In
Fiscal Court of Taylor County v. Taylor
County Metro Police, furloughed police
officers challenged Taylor County's
ability to effectively terminate its police
services by appropriating inadequate
funds.59 The Kentucky Supreme Court
determined that the county's decision
was not subject to judicial review,
describing the decision to fund and
maintain a police force as "political."60
Similar decisions have permitted municipalities to cease the operation of the
local jail,61 close a fire station even
where the closing potentially endangered residents,62 and abolish the
Chicago's Transit Authority police
force.63

B. Legislative and Judicial
Furloughs
The separation of powers doctrine
prevents state or city executives from
directly furloughing the employees of
other branches, though the legislature
can still effectively force furloughs by
reducing appropriations, with some
exceptions. For the sake of parity with
executive branch employees, legislative
leaders have sometimes volunteered to
take furloughs themselves and extended
furloughs to all legislative branch
employees.64 Many state constitutions
explicitly prevent their legislative
branches from altering the pay of state
judges, but judicial furloughs can be a
practical reality when funding reductions reach other judicial branch
employees. In New Jersey, Article VI of
the state constitution prohibits any
reduction in judicial salaries during the
term of appointment.65 In an attempt at
achieving parity for all judicial branch
employees after declaring mandatory
furloughs for 8,500 administrative and
clerical staff in 2005, Chief Justice
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Stuart Rabner had success in asking for
voluntary furloughs by state judges.66
Most state judges agreed to take
voluntary unpaid furloughs in an effort
to share the fiscal pain and lost wages of
their employees.67
At the federal level, some courts have
been forced to implement furlough days
and shorten hours in recent years.68
When inadequate appropriations from
Congress result in layoffs or furloughs,
this "can erode the independence of the
judiciary," and "[w]hile the Constitution
attempts to provide some measure of
protection for the judiciary by making
clear that judges' salaries may not be
reduced, there is no provision whatsoever for the funding of the infrastructure needed for efficient courts: the
physical facilities, clerks, and staff."69 In
the battle over budget and the provision
of services, furloughs in the courts not
only threaten the separation of powers,
but provide an example of a significant
effect on the efficiency of the judiciary.70

IV. Limitations on the
Authority to Furlough
A. Collective Bargaining
Agreements & Impairment of
Contract Analysis
Unions find themselves in a precarious position when opposing an
employer's decision to furlough, since
employers with time-sensitive budget
issues may opt to implement permanent
layoffs instead. In 2003, AFSCME
argued that a proposed statewide oneday furlough of State of Illinois
employees violated the terms of their
collective bargaining agreement, and
sought an injunction and an order for
arbitration.71 After the court granted the
injunction, the employer "amended its
furlough plan to provide for permanent
layoffs in seven State agencies and
began to implement the amended
plan."72 The injunction was ultimately
upheld as valid, but AFSCME was left to
arbitrate the issue of the employer's
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layoffs instead of furloughs.73
Though the issue has not been
explicitly decided in any jurisdiction, at
least one court has indicated that the
impact of furloughs is subject to
mandatory bargaining and a public
employer commits an unfair labor
practice when it refuses to bargain prior
to implementation. In Commonwealth v.
Board, Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Bd., the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania reviewed an order of the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
finding the employer had committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to
bargain over the transfer of its employees out of the bargaining unit.74 The
employer's plan included long-term
furloughs with recall rights for employees once the economy improved; the
court indicated that because the decision to furlough affected the "hours,
wages, and terms and conditions of
employment" of the workers, the impact
of the decision fell outside of the
managerial prerogative exception and
the implementation of the furlough was
a mandatory bargaining issue.75 Applying Pennsylvania's "balancing test of the
various competing interests of the
public employer and the public employees in order to determine whether a
particular issue is subject to bargaining," the court approved the Board's
determination that even where the
employer decided to furlough employees for a legitimate reason such as the
lack of funding, the employer's "furlough
of . . . employees . . . [was] clearly [a]
matter[] of fundamental concern to the
employees' interest in wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."76
Where a collective bargaining agreement expressly guarantees a minimum
level of wages or hours, a furlough would
normally constitute a breach of the
agreement. Where an agreement exists
and the furlough is done pursuant to
state law, unions can challenge the
"unilateral "amend[ment] [of] collective
bargaining agreements without further
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negotiations,"77 as a violation of the
Contract Clause in the U.S. Constitution.78 A furlough enacted pursuant to
state law is not a breach of contract, but
the law itself may be an invalid
impairment of the contract.79
The Contract Clause, "on its face . . .
appears to be absolute," but "courts have
held that the Contract Clause does not
take precedence over the police power
of the state to protect the general
welfare of its citizens, a power which 'is
paramount to any rights under contracts
between individuals.'"80 In U.S. Trust
Co. of New York v. New Jersey, the
Supreme Court indicated that the
Contract Clause applies to both public
contracts as well as private ones:
It long has been established that the
Contract Clause limits the power of
the States to modify their own
contracts as well as to regulate those
between private parties. . . . Yet, the
Contract Clause does not prohibit
the States from repealing or amending statutes generally, or from
enacting legislation with retroactive
effects.81
The Supreme Court instead set out to
"reconcile the requirements of the
Contract Clause with the essential
attributes of sovereign power necessarily reserved by the states to safeguard
the welfare of their citizens."82 The
Supreme Court's analysis in U.S. Trust
requires a three-part inquiry to determine the constitutionality of impairments for both private and public
contracts.83 The court first assesses
whether "the legislation at issue, in fact,
impairs a contract."84 If the court finds
an impairment, it must second "determine whether said impairment constitutes a "substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship."85 Finally, the
court must determine whether the
impairment is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose."86
The application of the Contract
Clause to public contracts differs in an
important way, however, in that courts
are not willing to grant the same level of
deference to state legislatures when the
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contracts are of their own making. In
determining what is "reasonable and
necessary," the U.S. Supreme Court
noted:
[C]omplete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and
necessity is not appropriate because
the State's self-interest is at stake.
A governmental entity can always
find a use for extra money, especially
when taxes do not have to be raised.
If a State could reduce its financial
obligations whenever it wanted to
spend the money for what it regarded
as an important public purpose, the
Contract Clause would provide no
protection at all."87
The First Circuit has indicated that,
though complete deference to a state's
impairment of public contracts is
inappropriate, "where economic or social
legislation is at issue, some deference to
the legislature's judgment is surely called
for."88
1. The Development of the Contract
Clause in Furlough Litigation
In 1992, the New York legislature
passed a state finance law "which
effect[ed] a five-day lag payroll upon
both represented and unrepresented
nonjudicial employees of the Unified
Court System for the fiscal year."89
Under the law, additional "savings
[were] to be realized by paying employees for nine days, rather than 10, in each
biweekly salary check over five payroll
periods. The wages deferred [were] to be
paid in lump sums when the employees'
service [was] terminated, either by
retirement or death."90 The employees'
union sued, arguing the statute violated
the Contract Clause.
The New York Court of Appeals had
little trouble finding a substantial
impairment of the collective bargaining
agreement, noting that "withholding 10
percent of an employee’s expected
wages each week over a period of 10
weeks . . . is not an insubstantial
impairment to one confronted with
monthly debt payments and daily
expenses for food and other necessities
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of life."91 In reaching the last step of the
analysis – whether the legislation was
"reasonable and necessary to accomplish the State's purposes" – the court
indicated that while it would typically
defer to the state's choice of "revenueraising or revenue-saving devices," the
impairment was not on the "menu of
alternatives."92 Because other alternatives were available, the legislation was
deemed unconstitutional, and the court
upheld the enjoinment of the legislation's
enforcement.93
In the New York litigation, the
substantial impairment was a long-term
delay in pay rather than an actual
diminishment in compensation. It follows that mandatory unpaid furloughs,
in which there is an actual reduction in
compensation, should constitute substantial impairments in Contract Clause
analysis. The Fourth Circuit found a
substantial impairment when the City of
Baltimore declared mandatory furloughs during a budget crisis.94 The
court noted that "at the very least,
where the contract right or obligation
impaired was one that induced the
parties to enter into the contract and
upon the continued existence of which
they have especially relied, the impairment must be considered 'substantial.'"
Though the court did not adopt a
particular minimum reduction sufficient to establish that an impairment
was "substantial,"95 it did "reject the . . .
contention that an annual salary
reduction of .95 percent is insubstantial."96 Just as the New York Court of
Appeals had cited the effect of the
proposed pay lag on public employees'
ability to pay monthly bills and provide
for food and other necessities, the
Fourth Circuit focused on the day-today effect of the lost wages resulting
from mandatory furloughs, noting that
an annual salary reduction of .95 percent
"could represent a substantial portion of
a monthly mortgage or rental payment,
or weeks of food," and indicating a
reluctance to hold that "any decrease . . .
beyond a de minimis one could be
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considered insubstantial."97
The Fourth Circuit next determined
that the furlough plan was reasonable
and necessary "in light of the magnitude
and timing of . . . cuts in state funding, .
. . the undisputed legitimacy of the City's
need to balance its budget, the City's
concerted efforts to exhaust numerous
alternative[s], . . . the . . . nature of the
furlough plan, and the City's immediate
abandonment of the reductions at the
first opportunity."98 This final determination has been heavily criticized, with
some arguing that the court gave too
much deference to the City in light of the
principle that the impairment of public
contracts should receive less deference.99
Several years later, in Massachusetts
Community College Council v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts applied Contract Clause analysis
to the declaration of legislativelydirected furloughs.100 The Massachusetts Legislature's enacted legislation
providing for furloughs "as a matter of
paramount public policy, during this
period of fiscal exigency."101 The legislature indicated in its findings that it
considered furloughs "the least painful
means" of reducing spending "while
permitting the continuation, without
any interruption, of the provisions of
vital services."102 The furlough gave
employees several options of how to
take their furlough days, and required
additional furlough days for employees
earning more than $25,000.103
Applying the analysis from U.S.
Trust, the court determined that the
furlough program "substantially impaired the Commonwealth's obligation
to pay compensation to the various
affected employees covered by the
collective bargaining agreements."104
The court cited Baltimore Teachers
Union with approval for the proposition
that even small reductions in compensation can amount to substantial impairments of collective bargaining agreements.105
The Massachusetts Supreme Court
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determined that the furloughs were not
reasonable under the third part of the
U.S. Trust analysis. Though the financial situation in Massachusetts in 1990
was precarious and the legislature had
legitimate concerns regarding its ability
to balance the budget, it had already
allocated sufficient funds to pay the
compensation called for in its collective
bargaining agreements with state employee unions.106 Indeed, it sought to
declare furloughs in order to "generate
revenue surpluses that would be
available at the end of the fiscal year."107
Moreover, the court determined that
"[t]he fiscal problems . . . were
reasonably foreseeable when the collective bargaining agreements were
signed."108 Though the ultimate difficulties proved worse than expected, "[a]ny
difference . . . was a difference in degree
and not a difference in kind," leading the
court to declare the "substantial impairment of State employees' rights under
collective bargaining agreements cannot be justified as reasonable."109
After Massachusetts Community, the
fiscal crisis of the early 1990s calmed.
Contract Clause jurisprudence with
respect to furloughs would remain
largely dormant until the most recent
downturn,110 when the issue was again
raised in Fraternal Order of Police v.
Prince George's County, Maryland.111 In
the wake of the housing bubble, Prince
George's County sought to close a
revenue gap by furloughing 5,900
employees.112 The County was hit more
severely than others, and had the
highest foreclosure rate in Maryland at
one point.113 Several unions representing the employees sued, arguing that the
County could not abrogate the collective
bargaining agreements in light of the
Contract Clause.114
Applying the three-part inquiry, the
Federal District Court for the District of
Maryland determined that there had in
fact been an impairment when the
county furloughed its employees,115 and
that the resulting 3.85 percent salary
reduction was a significant impair-
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ment.116 Turning to the issue of whether
the impairment was "reasonable and
necessary,"117 the court found that the
county's actions were unreasonable
because they sought to recoup more than
one third of their total deficit of $57
million from the employees, and did not
narrowly tailor the plan to take the
minimum amount necessary, as the City
of Baltimore had done in Baltimore
Teacher's Union.118 Nor were the
furloughs a necessity: the county had
forewarning of the downturn and had
significant reserve funds that it could
have drawn from to avoid impairing
collective bargaining agreements (the
county had chosen not to do so to
preserve its bond rating).119
On appeal, however, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that there had been no impairment of the contract, since the county
personnel laws permitted officials to
require furloughs unless "specifically
provided otherwise in . . . collective
bargaining agreements."120 While the
union had previously bargained for
prohibitions on furloughs, no such
prohibition appeared in the operative
agreement.121 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the furlough provisions in the
county personnel laws were sufficiently
narrow, and did not prevent the parties
from entering into an otherwise "meaningful and binding contract."122

B. Furlough Challenges Based
on Due Process
The Contract Clause cannot protect
collective bargaining agreements from
Congressional impairment in the District of Columbia, since the Clause only
applies to the states.123 In affirming "the
expansiveness of Congress's power to
legislate for the District," and refusing
to recognize "any constitutional limitation on that power derived from
constitutional limitations on actions by
states,"124 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals determined that
furlough days enacted through appro-
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priations legislation were not subject to
Contract Clause review.125
In District of Columbia v. AFSCME,
the union alternatively argued that
Congress was limited in its ability to
impair collective bargaining agreements under the Due Process Clause in
the Fifth Amendment.126 The trial court
agreed that the Due Process Clause does
limit Congress in this respect. On
appeal, and under the rational basis
standard, the D. C. Court of Appeals
determined that the city's furlough plan,
approved in Congressional appropriations, was based on reasonable judgments about the availability and allocation of resources, and that there had
been no violation of the unions' due
process rights.127
C. Analyzing Contract Clause
Jurisprudence and Union Strategy
Challenging furloughs as unconstitutional violations of the Contract Clause
should prove a popular avenue if the
jurisprudence continues to develop
favorably against impairment. A full
survey of all public contracts impairment case law published in 2007
concluded that "[e]ven in cases of
extreme fiscal crisis, including bankruptcy, the courts have been reluctant to
modify or repeal the provisions of
collective bargaining agreements."128 A
secondary benefit of the jurisprudence
thus far is that the Contract Clause can
be cited just as easily in New York as it
can be in California, and against cities
just as easily as against states or the
federal government. Moreover, and as
the decisions in Baltimore Teachers
Union and Massachusetts Community
College Council indicate, it is relatively
easy to demonstrate a substantial
impairment of a collective bargaining
agreement even where the wages lost
from mandatory furloughs are later
reimbursed.129 Indeed, except for Baltimore Teachers Union,130 which was
highly criticized, unions whose collective bargaining agreements guaranteed
a minimum level of hours or wages had
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yet to lose an impairment claim in
furlough litigation until the reversal in
Fraternal Order of Police.131 Now, in the
Fourth Circuit at least, unions will have
to be mindful of local personnel laws
requiring specific provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement prohibiting furlough plans.
The strategy to challenge furloughs is
not without its perils, however, in that
while reducing the compensation level
provided in a collective bargaining
agreement may run afoul of the Contract
Clause, it is also usually a more
amenable solution for state employees
than the elimination of staff positions
altogether. If states and municipalities
see a trend toward furloughs being
struck down as unconstitutional, they
will be less likely to declare furlough
days and more likely to proceed directly
to reducing staff through layoffs, as was
the case when AFSCME sought to
challenge unilateral furloughs in 2003,132
as discussed in Part IV. In this analysis,
unions should take care not to overuse
Contract Clause suits. Unions should to
strike a balance, whereby their employers will use furloughs to avoid layoffs
when the financial situation is truly
dire, but will avoid using furloughs
when there are more ready alternatives
that will not impact members of the
bargaining unit. Impairment litigation
can be seen as a tactical option to be used
only sparingly in directing the behavior
of the employer.

V. Conclusion
Furloughs will likely continue to be a popular tool for state officials seeking to reduce expenditures in light of shrinking
revenues while maintaining employee expertise and morale. Unions prefer furloughs to layoffs because they keep members on their rolls and offer an additional bargaining chip to negotiate long-term
job security. But mandatory unpaid furloughs can anger unions when imposed
unilaterally, and have the potential to
generate challenges based on a variety
of legal theories.
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Perhaps the most widespread and
successful approach for unions thus far
has been to challenge furloughs under the
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
As the economic downturn proceeds into
its third and fourth years, the litigation
over furloughs will continue. Unions will
win sometimes, requiring compensation
for days never worked – and services that
the state will never receive; and states will
win sometimes, affecting the local
economies which are dependent on the incomes of state workers. In the meantime,
state workers and the members of the public who rely on government services will
continue to be caught in the crosshairs of
uncertainty as the courts work out the limits on state authority to send workers home
without pay.
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Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments
under the collective bargaining statutes.

IELRA Developments
Charter Schools
In Chicago Mathematics & Science
Academy Charter School, Inc. and
Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers &
Staff, IFT, AFT Case No. 13-RM-1768
(NLRB RD 2010), the Region 13 Office of
the National Labor Relations Board
held that Chicago Math and Science
Academy Charter School (CMSA) is
"political subdivision of the State of
Illinois," and therefore outside of the
jurisdiction under the National Labor
Relations Act.
The Regional Director dismissed a
petition filed by CMSA seeking an
election after the Chicago Alliance of
Charter Teachers and Staff filed a
majority interest representation petition with the IELRB.
Section 2(2) of the NLRA excludes
"any state or political subdivision
thereof." The Regional Director applied
the test set forth in NLRB v. National

Gas Utility District of Hawkins County,
Tennessee. 402 U.S. 600 (1971), which
limits the political subdivision exemption to entities that are either (i) created
by the state, so as to constitute
departments or administrative arms of
the government, or (ii) administered by
individuals who are responsible to
public officials or the general electorate.
The Regional Director found that CMSA
is "clearly a political subdivision of the
State of Illinois under both prongs . . .
each one by itself equally compelling."
The Regional Director found that
CMSA was a creation of Illinois statute,
satisfying the first prong of the Hawkins
test. The enabling legislation for charter
schools is the Charter Schools Law,
1995. 105 ILCS 5/27A-1 et. seq., which
establishes the state's intent, authorizes
local school boards to certify a charter,
and provides for public funding, governmental oversight and accountability
requirements.
The Regional Director emphasized
that the Illinois General Assembly's
declared purpose for enacting the
Charter Schools Law was "to create a
legitimate avenue for parents, teachers,
and community member to take responsible risks and create new, innovative,
and more flexible ways of educating
children within the public school system." (emphasis in Board opinion).
The Regional Director also found that
the recent declaratory amendments to the
Charter Schools Law providing that a
charter school shall comply with the
IELRA and that the governing body of the
a charter school is an "educational
employer" subject to the IELRA, respectively, further exemplified legislative
intent that charter schools are within the
public school system.
The Regional Director found that the
CMSA was accountable to Chicago
Public Schools (CPS) for compliance
with the charter, provisions of law and
its finances. CMSA's Board of Directors,
although not appointed or subject to
removal by public officials, are nonetheless accountable to CPS to such an
extent that its governing body is
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responsible to the public officials or to
the general electorate. CMSA's Board of
Directors must submit independent
annual financial audits, a detailed
budget, and quarterly statements. CMSA
receives 80 percent of its operating
budget from CPS. CMSA's compliance
with reporting requirements to CPS
determines the amount of funding
allocated to CMSA and whether its
charter is renewed, put on probation or
revoked by CPS. These reporting
requirements include daily accountability reports, academic progress oversight, and required teacher credentials.

Duty to Bargain
In Thornton Fractional High School
District No. 215 v. IELRB No. 1-09-1597,
2010 WL 3834467 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. Sept.
30, 2010), the Illinois Appellate Court for
the, First District reversed the IELRB’s
determination that the District had violated
of the IELRA. The IELRB had affirmed
the administrative law judge's holdings
that that the District violated section
14(a)(5) of the Act when it changed the
hiring policy in the guidance office at
Thornton Fractional South High School
without notice or negotiation with the
Union and sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1)
when it refused to give Carmen Mureiko
a 12-month position as the most senior
secretary.
Mureiko testified before the ALJ that
she started working at Thornton South
on June 17, 1997, and began working in
the registrar position in 1999. In
February of 2005, District Superintendent Robert Wilhite announced that at
the start of the 2005-06 school year, in
an attempt to reduce a major budget deficit,
"all 12-month building secretaries will
be reduced to 10.5 months except the
principal secretary and the senior
guidance secretary." Mureiko testified
that Thornton South principal John
Hallberg told the secretaries at Thornton
South that the most senior employee in
the guidance department, Kim Nichols,
would remain a 12-month employee.
In February 2006, certain clerical
employees of the District met with the
Union, decided on representation by the
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Union and selected officers. Mureiko
was selected as vice president and
grievance officer.
In February 2007, Mureiko addressed
a bargaining session about the need to
increase the hours worked by the
clerical staff . Mureiko testified that
District Board President Debbie
Waitekus told her to be “careful what
she wished for,” and superintendent
Wilhite told her “to be careful” about her
comments.
In May 2007, a secretarial position
became vacant at Thornton South. The
vacancy posting did not specify whether
the position was a 12-month or 10.5month position, but it was given to Kim
Taylor, who was less senior than
Mureiko by more than two years, on a 12month basis. Mureiko continued to be
employed on a 10.5 month basis.
When questioned about this decision
at a bargaining meeting, the District did
not offer an explanation other than it was
not obliged to assign Mureiko to the position.
Dr. Wilhite testified that he told his building principals and his assistant principal
that he wanted the "best preson to be able
to take care of that Guidance Office in the
summer regardless of seniority." Waitekus
testified there was never a practice or understanding between the Union and District that employees who had their hours
cut from 12 months to 10.5 months would
have their positions restored based on seniority. Waitekus also denied that Mureiko’
s participation in union activities was discussed by the District before a decision
was made on her application and said “
she didn’t know that Ms. Mureikos even
had anything to do with organizing the
union until this hearing. She also denied
telling Mureiko to be “careful what she
wished for.”
Emilie Junge, field service director for
the Union, testified that she asked the
District's attorney "what the deal was"
with Mureiko not being selected for a 12month assignment and that the attorney
responded "[Mureiko will] never get it."
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Junge also admitted that during
negotiations the Union withdrew a
proposal to "restore staff 12 months to
10.5 months.
The IELRB found that the evidence
established a "status quo" of assigning
12-month schedules in the guidance
department based on seniority. The
IELRB found that the District violated
Section 14(a)(5) when it denied Mureiko
a 12-month schedule despite her seniority, also noting the District’s refusal to
discuss the issue and the District’s
attorney’s statement that Mureiko
would “never get it.”
The Appellate Court applied a
"clearly erroneous" standard for reversal. With respect to the 14(a)(5)
violation, the court noted that "a term or
condition of employment must be an
established practice in order to constitute a status quo," and that whether a
status quo exists must be determined on
a 'case-by-case' basis" and include an
evaluation of past history, past bargaining practice, existing contract terms and
the reasonable expectations of employees.
The court held that in this case there
were no existing contract terms or
written pronouncements by the District
indicating an official policy of assigning
the guidance department’s 12-month
schedules based solely on senority. The
court noted that the parties had also
stipulated before the ALJ that the
"Educational Support Staff Work Rules
and Regulations" from 2002 to 2006 did
not state that seniority controls which
employees schedules were reduced from
10.5 months or which employees had a
first right to a future 12-month position.
The court also held that the evidence
of past bargaining was insufficient to
show the District failed to bargain in
good faith. The court noted that despite
Mureiko’s testimony that she received
no answers about why she was not
selected for the position, there was
nothing in the record showing a
proposal was made by the the union to
bargain over the issue of Mureiko
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receiving the 12-month position. The
court further noted that Junge testified
consciously chose to withdraw
the
general proposal that would have given
Mureiko a 12-month position.
Finally, the Court held that the
employees in the guidance office could
not have reasonably expected seniority
to be the determining factor in the
selection of 12-month employees because there was no such past practice
and, even assuming they were made,
representations to that effect by the
assistant principal and the assistant
superintendent did not carry the weight
of policy pronouncements.

Layoffs
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Board of
Education, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105715
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2010) the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois ordered the Board of Education
to rescind discharges of tenured teachers, and to promulgate a set of recall
rules, following good faith negotiations
with the Chicago Teachers Union,
within 30 days. The court also permanently enjoined the layoffs or “honorable
discharges” until such time as the recall
rules are promulgated.
Facing significant budget deficits
before the 2010-2011 school year, the
Board was forced to lay off nearly 1,300
teachers. The Board implemented its
layoffs through a series of resolutions
authorizing the "honorable termination" of tenured teachers, and authorizing schools to first lay off teachers who
were under remediation and whose last
performance ratings were negative.
However, the majority of tenured
teachers laid off were rated "excellent,"
"superior," or "satisfactory."
Throughout the summer, the Board

implemented layoffs of 1,289 teachers. All laid-off teachers received
notice of their termination, but
were not provided an opportunity
to demonstrate their qualifications
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for retention in some capacity.
The Union argued that tenured
teachers, laid off for economic reasons,
had a due process right to some type of
retention procedure before they were
permanently discharged. The Court
stated that to prevail on a claim for the
deprivation of property without due
process, a plaintiff must establish that
she holds a property interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, such property interests are not
formed by the Constitution, but are
created by existing rules, such as state
law.
The Union located the property
interest in 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31), which
requires the Board to consider teachers'
qualifications, certifications, experience, performance ratings or evaluations, and . . . job performance" when
implementing layoffs. The Union relied
on Mims v. Bd. of Educ., 523 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir. 1975), which held that that plaintiffs
had a property interest in their
continued active employment, and that
the board failed to establish a procedure
for employees to obtain review of layoff
decisions to ensure they were not for
impermissible reasons or to demonstrate that they should have been
retained in some capacity.
The court agreed that, in light of Mims
and 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31), the Board
violated the tenured teachers' due
process rights to some sort of retention
procedure, because the Board failed to
promulgate rules to govern layoffs
which were contemplated by Section 5/
34-18(31). Although the court admitted
that the statute's statement that the
Board "shall have the power" to
promulgate rules is "ambiguous," it
noted when the Board passed its
resolution to consider performance
ratings and evaluations when making
layoff decisions, the Board explained
that this rule was "require[d]" by Section
5/34-18(31). The court concluded that
Section 5/34-18(31) provides tenured
teachers some residual property rights
in the event of an economic layoff.

Fall 2010
However, the court stated that normally
state law rules and regulations create
the property interest whereas here
there were "no rules, only the statutory
authorization/requirement for rules under 5/34-18(31)[, and] [w]ithout rules or
regulations, the court can do no more
than read 5/34-18(31) as vaguely providing a property interest in some sort of
retention procedure." The court added,
"Because the court lacks institutional
competence to draft the missing rules
and regulations," the Board must
compile a set of rules in consultation
with the Union which abides by Section
5/34-18(31).

IPLRA Developments
In Illinois Council of Police v. ILRB,
Local Panel, No. 1-09-1859 and 1-091860, 2010 WL 3834596 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.
Sept. 30, 2010) the First District
Appellate Court affirmed the Local
Panel’s certification of a new, standalone bargaining unit
of aviation
security sergeants.
This decision
partially overturned Illinois Council of
Police & Sheriffs, Local 7, 18 PERI § -01010 (ILRB Local Panel 2002), where the
Board found that the aviation security
sergeants were not peace officers under
the IPLRA and a stand-alone bargaining
unit for the sergeants was not appropriate.
The City aruged that the only
appropriate bargaining unit for the
sergeants would be a preexisting Unit II
which included other aviation security
employees because the stand-alone unit
would create fragmentation.
In affirming the ILRA’s decision, the
court examined the Board's departure
from its long standing-preference for
large, broad functionally based bargaining units and recent precedent in
certifying small, stand-alone units. The
court stated that an agency may adjust
its standards and policies in light of
experience, as long as the adjustments
are not arbitrary and capricious. The
court analyzed three recent Board
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certifications of smaller units, and
determined that this departure was
"anything but arbitrary and capricious."
See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 23 PERI ¶ 172, (ILRB Local Panel,
(2007) (Board certified unit of 23
supervising police communications operators); State v. ILRB, 388 Ill. App. 3d
319, 902 N.E.2d 1122 (2009) (affirming
decision of the Board in Illinois Nurses
Ass'n, 23 PERI 173 (ILRB State Panel,
2007) (certifying a unit of six Bureau of
Administrative Litigation staff attorneys), City of Chicago v. ILRB, 396 Ill.
App. 3d 61, 918 N.E. 2d 1103 (2009)
(affirming Board decision certifying
unit of 34 public health nurses).
The Board has held that the fragmentation factor by itself was insufficient to
deny a petition seeking unit certification for a small subset of employees who
had never been represented.
In
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
the Board explained, that "although the
preference for large functionally-based
unit was, and continues to be, an
important consideration, . . . excessive
concern with avoiding fragmentation
and promoting economy and efficiency
in public bargaining and contract
administration consumed not only the
employee's right to organize, but also
the criteria set forth in section 9(b)." The
court found this reason more than
adequate to show that the shift in
certifying smaller units was well
considered and reasonable. Thus, given
the shift in Board policy to certify
smaller units, it was not clearly
erroneous for the Board to certify this
bargaining unit though it had denied
certification of the same unit in 2002. ‚
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